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The Rights and Obligations of
Those Subject to Inquiry and of Witnesses
David W. Scott, Q.C.*
1. INTRODUCTION
There are questions raised from time to time as to the desirability of
continued utilization of the public inquiry as we know it. These questions
ordinarily arise in the context of a consideration of the issues outlined in this
paper, that is to say, the rights and obligations of those subject to inquiry. In a
classic description of the public inquiry Mr. Justice Middleton observed as
follows:
It must not be forgotten that this is an inquiry directed by the government into
the affairs of its own creature, a Children's Aid Society, with the view of ascer-
taining if it is discharging its true function in the public service. Suspicion of
wrong-doing and maladministration exist. Is there any foundation? It is in no
sense a trial of any one. It is an inquiry not governed by the same rules as are
applicable to the trial of an accused person. The public, for whose service this
Society was formed, is entitled to full knowledge of what has been done by it
and by those who are its agents and officers and manage its affairs. What has
been done in the exercise of its power and in discharge of its duties is that which
the Commissioner is to find out; so that any abuse, if abuse exist, may be
remedied and misconduct, if misconduct exist, may be put an end to and be
punished, not by the Commissioner, but by appropriate proceedings against any
individual.
* Scott & Aylen, Ottawa. Served as Commission Counsel in the Sinclair Stevens Inquiry.
The writer is indebted to Fay Brunning-Howard, LL.B. (Queens) for her research assistance.
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This is a matter in which the fullest inquiry should be permitted. All documents
should be produced, and all witnesses should be heard, and the fullest right to
cross-examine should be permitted. Only in this way can the truth be disclosed.'
A contrary view, raising questions as to the adequacy of protection of the
rights of individuals, has been expressed in an article written by Gordon E
Henderson entitled "Abuse of Power by Royal Commissions".'
2. THE POWERS OF COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY
While the title of this paper identifies the "obligations" of witnesses and
those subject to inquiry as one aspect of the study, it is apparent that this really
invites an analysis of the extent of the powers of commissioners under inquiry
legislation. It is against these powers that the adequacy of safeguards for the
protection of individual rights ought to be tested and a balance struck.
(a) The Power to Summon Witnesses
The fundamental power of commissions of inquiry, frequently described
as the coercive power, is that of summoning witnesses, requiring them to give
evidence on oath or by affirmation, whether orally or in writing, and further
requiring them to produce such documents and things as the commissioners
deem requisite. This power is the hallmark of most inquiries legislation. It is
tempered only by the proper exercise of discretion having regard to jurisdic-
tional imperatives dictated by the precise mandate or terms of reference.
The powers described above are outlined in section 4 of the federal
Inquiries Act.3 They are matched in one form or another by equivalent powers
in all inquiries legislation at the provincial level. The only modest departure
from what is found in the sweeping federal power is in the Newfoundland
statute.' A question arises as to whether the Order in Council establishing the
commission must specify a power to compel production of documents or
whether the statutory provision is broad enough to encompass this power by
reason of its equating a commission to a court of law in terms of its ability to
compel the attendance of witnesses. The Public Inquiries Act of Prince
Edward Island5 makes no specific provision for compelling testimony under
oath. Presumably, the power is inferentially present, again, by way of the
equating of commissions of inquiry with courts of record in civil cases.
1 Re Children's Aid Society of the County of York, 119341 O.W.N. 418 at 421 (C.A.).
2 [1979] Spec. Lect. L.S.U.C. 403.
3 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11.
4 Public Enquiries Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 314.
5 R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. P-30.
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[In public discussion following this paper, Mr. Scott elaborated as follows:]
Dean Christie: Would you address the question of the breadth of the
commission's power to issue subpoenas; perhaps you would give us your view
on the issuing of subpoenas to judges.
Mr. Scott: Well, I think the test for issuing subpoenas is purely one of rele-
vance. In other words, if a person has evidence to offer which is within the
terms of reference in terms of relevance, then they are open to the exercise of
subpoena power as is any other citizen. As I understand it, the judges in the
Marshall Inquiry are claiming an immunity based on the independence of the
judiciary. And if there is such an immunity, then the subpoenas will be
quashed. I don't know whether there is or is not. But to me, the subpoena
power contemplated in all these statutes is a coercive one and it applies to
everybody and there are no exceptions unless there is some public interest or
some privilege that excludes the exercise of that power, whether it applies to
judges or not. We all have our own ideas as to what's happening here, but
whether it will work or not is another question.
Dean Christie: Can I ask a rather more technical question about subpoenas?
This comes out of experience as chair of arbitration boards or the labour
board. As I understand it, the issue of a subpoena in a court proceeding is
pretty much an administrative process that can then be challenged, usually in
Chambers. In other contexts, including commissions of inquiry, there is not
that same established mechanism for testing whether a subpoena is too broad
or impractical. The problem arises particularly with subpoenas that order the
bringing of documentation. Can you just explain to us from your experience,
how that gets worked out, practically, in commission contexts?
Mr. Scott: The interesting thing about commissions is you read the statute
and you see all these powers and then leap ahead and imagine yourself sitting
in an office that is not even decorated yet. The commissioner is there and he's
got his counsel and a few staff, and you are actually drafting the text of a
subpoena and there is nobody there to even serve it, let alone enforce it. So
you look at the statute and you see it says you have all the powers of a court of
record for enforcing the attendance of witnesses. That to me is a definition of
the commission of inquiry's entitlement to demand the attendance of
witnesses. But to actually enforce it, you need, in effect, the mechanical
process and that to me means the court. And so depending on the jurisdiction,
if a witness did not turn up, for example, in a federal inquiry, I would apply ex
parte as commission counsel in the Federal Court, Trial Division, for an order
of the court requiring the attendance of that person before the commission.
And I would do that exparte and if the person felt that there was no obligation
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to attend or wished to attack the subpoena, that would be done by notice to the
commission before the judge or another judge of the court that issued the
order.
In other words, it's one thing to say you can enforce the attendance of
people, but you need, not only an order, but the mechanical processes in the
court, including the sheriff or the constable, or contempt powers. Those sim-
ply do not exist in the process, although an attempt is made to create them in
jurisdictions like Manitoba and Alberta.
Dean Christie: May I ask one more final question along these lines? I'm
thinking of the particular problem that I have encountered with a subpoena, to
bring documents, which is unduly broad. It is not that the person upon whom
the subpoena is served is not willing to turn up and to bring along appropriate
documents, it is just that the order on its face is over broad and there may be
documents that arguably are not relevant and he or she does not want to
submit them.
Now I take it from what you said that your sense of it would be that it
would be the court in Chambers, acting as the enforcing arm of the commis-
sion, that would actually determine what the proper definition of the subpoena
was. I thought I heard John Sopinka say this morning that there might be some
kind of a preliminary proceeding.
Mr. Scott: Oh, I think of course there might be.
Dean Christie: In other words, if you got a subpoena which you said was too
broad, the first thing you'd do is attend before the commission, and say to the
commissioner, "I believe this is too broad" and make your submissions.
Suppose the commissioner disagreed, said it was appropriate and demanded
that it be complied with. Then where are you?
Mr. Scott: Where you are is making an application in the courts to quash it. I
am also saying that if you reverse that and ask what happens when you do not
show up and the commission wants to enforce your attendance, what does the
commission do? They do exactly the same thing. The commission applies to
the court for an order.
In fact, the Ontario scheme is just that exactly. In other words, the
commissioners have all the powers to issue subpoenas, but when it comes to
enforcing them, they have to invoke the aid of the court. Thus there is, for
example, no contempt by the failure to turn up at a commission of inquiry in
Ontario because it can only be contempt once an effective process has been
served on you. That results from the stated case exercise. So there's the
mechanical step in there. Certainly I agree, as John Sopinka says, there would
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be a courtesy call on the commissioner to see whether you could persuade him
to change his mind.
Mr. MacKay: If I could just do one quick follow-up what can be sub-
poenaed? Would there not also be constitutional limits on a provincial inquiry
as to who could be subpoenaed and I think the answer to that is yes. This may
be a problem area and you may want to duck it. But what's the position of the
section 96 judge who operates under a provincial statute in a provincial court
but is federally appointed and federally paid?
Mr. Scott: Well, I'll duck that one and leave it to you academics. Obviously,
Keable6 is a good illustration of a case where constitutional imperatives deter-
mined whether or not the process could be enforced against the Solicitor
General. And I think the same kind of criteria would come into play in the
problem you pose.
[End of discussion on that topic.]
(b) The Powers of a Court
The coercive force associated with the power to compel testimony
emanates from statutory schemes which variously contemplate that commis-
sions of inquiry will have the authority of courts of record in civil
proceedings, the power to issue warrants to secure attendance and the power
to commit for contempt.
Section 5 of the federal Inquiries Act contains the enforcement mecha-
nism. It equates the powers of a commissioner under the statute with those of
a court of record in civil cases. However, while commissions of inquiry can
issue subpoenas in their own form, they have no infrastructure equivalent to
that of a court, sheriff's officers and constables and thus some further step is
necessary in order to enforce such powers. Under the federal scheme, this
would involve an application to the Federal Court for the issuance of an order
enforcing the commission's statutory power.
Further, section 5 of the federal statute speaks only of witnesses and
makes no reference to "documents or things" in its likening of its powers to
those of a court of record in civil cases. Nonetheless, the authority in section 5
is expressed sufficiently broadly in terms of compellability that the ancillary
powers would necessarily be covered by inference.
6 A.G. (Que.) and Keable v. A.G. (Can.), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 218, (sub nom. Re Keable and
A.G. (Can.)) 6 C.R. (3d) 145, 43 C.C.C. (2d) 49, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 24 N.R.I.
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The Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Yukon statutes all have
specific provisions which confer upon commissions or tribunals the powers of
courts of record for the purpose not only of the compellability of witnesses,
but also the production of documents.
Some provincial legislatures have recognized the cumbersome en-
forcement situation which federal commissions of inquiry face in the exercise
of their powers and have developed more effective schemes. Thus in section
5(1) of the Alberta Public Inquiries Act, there is a specific power of committal
for contempt when one or more of the commissioners appointed under the Act
is a judge of the Court of Queen's Bench of the Province. There thus exists a
direct power to commit for contempt in the face of the tribunal, eliminating
the problem which exists in other jurisdictions that even when the commis-
sioner happens to be a judge, he sits as a statutory appointee and not as a
member of the judiciary in court.
In Manitoba, a tribunal may issue a warrant for the arrest of a witness
who fails to attend and may commit witnesses for refusal to testify.8 The
legislative scheme contemplates committals to the common jail for up to one
month and the utilization of police officers and constables, empowered under
provincial legislation, to effect the process.
In New Brunswick, the scheme is equally elaborate. The tribunal may
issue a warrant for the non-attendance of a witness under section 5 and may
enforce the same by utilizing the services of the sheriff's office or a constable.
Under section 6, it may commit a recalcitrant witness to the common jail for
contempt for a period of 30 days and from time to time thereafter for refusal to
respond to proper questions. Further, there is a specific power to commit for
contempt for the non-production of documents.
Ontario has a more restrictive enforcement regime. While the authority
to take testimony resides in the commission, there is no likening of its powers
to those of a civil court of record. Enforcement depends upon a formal applic-
ation by way of a stated case to the Divisional Court.
Thus, under section 8, if a witness does not attend at a hearing having
been duly summoned, or refuses to answer or submit to the oath, or refuses to
produce documents or things or does anything else that would amount to a
contempt of court, the commissioner or commissioners may state a case for
the opinion of the Divisional Court. The court will then effectively require the
party in question to show cause why he or she ought not to be punished for
contempt. This represents a significant check on the powers of commissioners
7 Public Inquiries Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-29, s. 4; Inquiry Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 198, s. 5;
Public Inquiries Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 250, s. 3; Public Inquiries Act, R.S.Y. 1986,
c. 137, ss. 4, 5.
8 Evidence Act, S.M. 1987, c. E150, ss. 92-94.
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which exists under other regimes. On this point, Mr. Justice Estey (as he then
was) in Re Yanover and Kiroff noted as follows:
[T]he powers of a commission now are essentially, if not exclusively, investi-
gatory and are not judicial. When the authority of a commission to do any act or
thing is called into question the power vested in the commission is limited to
stating or refusing to state a case for the opinion of the Divisional Court. Nor has
a commission the power it enjoyed under the former Act, now repealed, to
enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel them to give evidence and
produce documents and things 'as is vested in any court in civil cases'. Specific-
ally a commission no longer has the power to adjudge the conduct of a witness
before it to be punishable contempt and to impose punishment for such conduct.
Notwithstanding the removal from a commission of the power of punishing for
contempt of it, it continues to be recognized that for the proper discharge of its
duties under a commission issued under the Act, it is essential that the disobedi-
ence to or defiance of the lawful requirements of the commission attract punish-
ment of the nature that Courts have traditionally meted out to those in contempt
of Court. Nevertheless the legislation has denied to a commission any punitive
power.9
The-only modest departure from this regime is to be found under section
16 of the Act which provides that, in situations in which Part IH of the statute
is declared to apply to the specific inquiry, the commission may make an ex
parte application to a district court judge to issue a warrant to apprehend a
witness if he or she does not appear. This introduces an element of con-
venience into an otherwise cumbersome process.
The Ontario regime, therefore, lends itself to a practical form of judicial
review, generally casting the onus on the commission to invoke the powers of
the court and thereby affording aggrieved parties an opportunity to test the
commission's jurisdiction before extraordinary powers are exercised against
them.
(c) The Power of Inspection of Public and Private Facilities
Part II of the federal statute deals with departmental inquiries. Under sec-
tion 7 this Part, the commissioners may conduct searches and inspections in
public offices and institutions. There is no equivalent power under Part I. In
Alberta, provided the Order in Council declares section 6 to be applicable to
the inquiry in question, the commission may view a public building and seize
any document or thing therein in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction.
In Manitoba, the power is even more extensive. Under section 91 of the Evid-
9 (1974), 6 O.R. (2d) 478 at 482-483, 22 C.C.C. (2d) 81, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 241 (C.A.).
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ence Act, the commission may enter upon and view any building or property
whether public or private.
(d) The Power of Search and Seizure in a Private Facility or Place
Other than the Province of Ontario, no statutory scheme contemplates
search and seizure in private premises. The Ontario power'is restricted. Under
section 15, assuming that Part HI has been declared in force by the terms of
the Order in Council, an ex parte order may be made by a judge of a District
Court, on the usual grounds for which warrants are issued, authorizing a
commission investigator, appointed for the purpose and assisted by the police
if necessary to enter and search buildings, receptacles or places and there
seize documents or things relevant to the inquiry. This is an extraordinary and
rarely used power. The failure of other schemes to provide an equivalent
power is both noteworthy and deliberate.
The above represent, broadly, the powers of commissions of inquiry
against which the obligations and related rights of witnesses and persons
subject to investigation must be measured. To the extent that there are powers,
there is a duty to respect them and thus there is a duty to attend, when properly
subpoenaed, to give evidence on oath and, if required, to produce documents
and things and to cooperate with the commission in the proper discharge of its
mandate as defined by its formative instrument.
3. THE RIGHTS OF WITNESSES AND THOSE SUBJECT TO
INQUIRY
In this section an attempt will be made to assess, in outline form, certain
of the fundamental rights which witnesses and those subject to inquiry might
claim in the face of the exercise of the powers of inquiry offices. No attempt is
made to analyze judicial review regimes in force at the provincial level or to
digest process protections found in statutory schemes relating to evidence.
The analysis is limited to the federal and provincial inquiries legislation and
the jurisprudence associated with it.
(a) The Right to Counsel
In the first place, the right to counsel must be contrasted, compared and
related to the right to participate in the inquiry process which will be dealth
with in the ensuing section. What is spoken of here is the statutory right and
not a right which may be dictated by common law jurisdictional requirements
for procedural fairness, nor a Charter"° right.
10 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF WITNESSES IN INQUIRIES 141
There are five basic statutory approaches. First, the simplest and
broadest expression of the right is in the province of Alberta where "anyone
appearing" before a commission is entitled to be represented by counsel. A
somewhat narrower version of the same idea is to be found in the Yukon
where, in a recently enacted provision under section 11 of the statute, any per-
son whose "actions are called into question" is entitled to be represented by
counsel.
Third, there is the federal scheme which is reasonably accurately mir-
rored in British Columbia and Prince Edward Island. Under this scheme (sec-
tion 12), the tribunal in a public inquiry may allow a person whose conduct is
being investigated to be represented by counsel and shall permit persons to be
represented by counsel where a charge is made against them during the
inquiry.
Fourth, in the province of Ontario, there is an alignment of the right to
counsel with the right to participate. Thus under section 5 anyone who by
substantial and direct interest is entitled to claim a right to participate may do
so utilizing the services of counsel.
Last, there are those provincial statutory schemes which make no
specific provision for counsel as such and this is the situation in Manitoba,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Quebec and Saskatchewan.
There is probably no specific need for a formulated right to counsel in the
statute. While the inquiry is investigative, the dictates of procedural fairness
would suggest that its process would demand a right to counsel altogether
apart from the dictates of the Charter.
Nonetheless, a regime such as that in place in Ontario might be inter-
preted to warrant refusal of counsel for a witness who is merely a witness
where, for example, a substantial but only indirect interest could be shown,
or, federally, where the witness' conduct was not being investigated and
against whom a charge had not been made.
(b) The Right to Participate
Should witnesses or persons subject to inquiry be given limited, full or any
standing in the inquiry? What does the right to participate mean? In practical
terms, it means the right to be present, to examine and to cross-examine
witnesses and to make submissions at the conclusion of the evidentiary phase
of the public hearing process. It involves, more specifically, the right to call
and examine one's own witnesses, to examine the witnesses called by others
and to cross-examine witnesses shown to be adverse in interest. The only
statutory regimes which provide for participation as such are Alberta and
Ontario. Obviously by implication or necessary intendment, other schemes
contemplate similar prerogatives.
In Alberta, under section 11, any witness who believes his interests may
be adversely affected and any person who satisfies the commission that any
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evidence may adversely affect his interest is to be given an opportunity to give
evidence on the matter and, subject to the exercise of the inquiry officers'
discretion, to call and cross-examine witnesses. This is known in inquiry par-
lance as "standing". The Alberta practice is somewhat unique.
Ontario's statutory arrangement is different. Under section 5, the
commissioner shall accord to any person who shows or satisfies the tribunal
that he or she has a substantial and direct interest in the subject matter of the
inquiry an opportunity to give evidence and call and cross-examine witnesses
on evidence relevant to his interest.
The basic difference between Alberta and Ontario is that in Alberta the
belief of the witness is enough to establish the right to participate. The criteria
for testing interest in Alberta is adversity. Ontario posits an objective standard
and the right to standing, once granted, is more limited. One's participation is
expressly confined to one's interest.
The federal scheme does not speak of standing or participation at all but
only the right to be represented under section 12. As earlier indicated, the
right to representation is discretionary or mandatory depending upon whether
the person is merely one who is being investigated or one against whom a
charge is made. Standing flows only by implication from the right to be
represented.
In practice, under both the federal and provincial schemes one of the first
steps in the public hearing phase of inquiries is to assess who shall be accord-
ed standing. Most public inquiries establish generous criteria, whatever the
specific dictates of the statute may be.
In terms of jurisprudence, Mr. Justice Morden noted that standing under
the Ontario statute depends upon a showing of a substantial and direct interest
and not merely that a finding of misconduct might be made against the appli-
cant." Under sections 12 and 13 of the federal statute and sections 5(1) and
5(2) of the Ontario statute, the participation and the notice provisions under
each scheme ought not to be equated one with the other.
In the Sick Children's Inquiry, 2 the Divisional Court in Ontario
approved the according of standing to the parents of children for the cause of
death portion of the hearing (Phase One), but not for the police investigation
portion of the hearing (Phase Two). The court concluded that in the latter
phase there was nothing to distinguish the public interest as represented by
Commission Counsel from the parents' interest and thus they were denied
standing.
11 Re Royal Commission on Conduct of Waste Management Inc. (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 207, 4
C.PC. 166, 80 D.L.R. (3d) 76 (Div. Ct.).
12 Parents of Babies Gosselin v. Grange (1984), 8 Admin. L.R. 250 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
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(c) The Right to Respond to a Charge of Misconduct in the Report
This relates to the so-called "section 13 process" derived from the section
of the federal Act bearing that number. The right to have notice of and to
respond to a charge or allegation of misconduct which the commission or
commissioners may make in the report is altogether apart from the right to
standing and the right to participate generally. Section 13 and its equivalents
in provincial statutes are simple in their language but difficult to manage in
practice. Section 13 provides that no report shall be made against any persons
until reasonable notice has been given to them of the charge of misconduct
alleged against them and they have been given an opportunity to be heard.
This section basically means that a commission should not make a find-
ing of misconduct unless the person had reasonable notice of the" allegation
and was given an opportunity to be heard. If he or she did not, in the course of
the inquiry, have such an opportunity, jurisdiction to make the report contain-
ing the allegation of misconduct against the person depends upon the commis-
sioners then providing such notice and opportunity.
Other statutes have somewhat different arrangements. In Alberta there
are two extra elements in section 12. The "opportunity to be heard" of federal
section 13 is spelled out in section 12 to include the giving of evidence and, at
the discretion of the commissioners, the calling of evidence and this right is
expressed to exist even though the person may already have given evidence
and called witnesses. This latter provision must surely be interpreted as mean-
ing that the named person had already given evidence and called witnesses but
not amounting to a response to the specific allegation of misconduct.
In Ontario, there are two different features under section 5(2) of the Act.
Thus the person against whom an allegation of misconduct may be made must
have reasonable notice of the substance of the misconduct and must be
allowed a full opportunity to be heard during the inquiry. The implication is
that the notice must be given during the inquiry whereas the federal Act
implies that the notice and the opportunity to be heard may be given on the
eve of delivery of the report and indeed after its preparation although obvious-
ly not after its release.
The leading case dealing with section 13 is the judgment of the Federal
Court Trial Division in Landreville v. R. (No. 2)." That case dealt with the
Rand Inquiry whose report was delivered in August 1966. The report, the
publication of which ultimately led to the plaintiff's resignation as a judge,
was utilized as a basis for a threatened joint address calling for his impeach-
ment. The allegations against Mr. Landreville related to his acquisition,
allegedly at no cost, of certain shares in Northern Ontario Natural Gas at a
13 [1977] 2 F.C. 726, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 380 (T.D.).
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time when he was the mayor of the City of Sudbury. Chief Justice Rand was
appointed a Commissioner to inquire into the issue of misconduct surrounding
the acquisition of the shares in question. The language of his mandate was
broad enough to encompass allegations of misconduct beyond the mere
acquisition of the shares but it was not specific in this connection. The
Commissioner was satisfied, and so reported, that the judge was guilty of
serious misconduct, qua judge, by reason of the manner in which he gave evi-
dence as a witness in certain judicial proceedings arising out of the North
Ontario Natural Gas affair. In his judgment, Collier J. concluded that the
terms of reference of the Rand Commission were broad enough to encompass
the findings of gross contempt which the Commissioner had concluded flowed
from the form of Mr. Landreville's evidence in the judicial proceedings, but
he also concluded that there was no allegation made, at any time, against him
with respect to this specific conduct. Thus he had no notice and no opportun-
ity to respond as contemplated by section 13. Accordingly, some ten years
after the report was published, and long after the judge had been forced to
resign, it was quashed. The case is an important illustration of the jurisdic-
tional feature of this statutory requirement.
The difficulty with section 13 relates to its administration. How can a
commission fairly and at the same time procedurally comply with this provi-
sion? If reasonable notice is given during the inquiry, either by specifics in its
terms of reference or by allegations during its course, then if the persons
affected responded and met the allegations during the course of the inquiry, no
special notice need be given under section 13 thereafter. However, if no such
notice of allegations of misconduct was given before or during the course of
the inquiry, then section 13 must specifically be complied with before the
commission's report is delivered. If notice is given literally before the report is
released, the opportunity to be heard would be somewhat illusory because the
commission would have identified allegations of misconduct in the course of
arriving at its conclusion and thus might be said to have effectively made up
its mind before notice was given. In such circumstances, one might be
forgiven for concluding that the opportunity to be heard was somewhat of a
sham. If the commission gives notice after hearing the argument of counsel,
the same sort of problem may arise. In any event, in an ideal environment the
commission itself should not given notice because the obvious implication is
that it may have drawn conclusions in order to draw the indictment. If a
formal notice under section 13 is required, it should probably be given
privately by commission counsel anticipating all possible findings of miscon-
duct which the commission might make. Further notice can be given if the
draft report suggests additional findings of misconduct.
A solution currently in use is to comply with the notice requirement by
way of commission counsel's argument. If argument is delivered in writing to
all parties and they are given an opportunity to be heard under section 13
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thereafter as long as commission counsel's argument is cast broadly enough to
include all possible conclusions as to misconduct, then the requisite notice has
surely been given. In any event, there is a universal plea for amendment to
this clumsy statutory arrangement.
(d) The Right to Insist Upon the Applicability of the Rules of Evidence
It is generally accepted that in ordinary circumstances in the work of public
inquiries the conventional rules of evidence are not strictly adhered to. This
point has been made repeatedly in many cases. Nonetheless, depending upon
the particular finding and its importance, and notwithstanding that compliance
with the strict rules of evidence is not required, cogent and reliable evidence
may be required.
Most statutory schemes recognize that, as a minimum, the application of
conventional evidentiary privileges represent protections which remain in
force. Thus, under section 8 of the Alberta statute every person appearing in
an inquiry has the same privileges as a witness in court. The statute does
provide, however, that public interest immunity, statutory or otherwise, does
not apply in public inquiries unless the Attorney General affirmatively cer-
tifies in a particular inquiry that it does.
Under section 11 of the Ontario Act, privileges under the law which ren-
der evidence inadmissible in court apply to the same effect in an inquiry. This
would extend to such principles as the inviolability of solicitor and client
communications, trade secrets, etc.
(e) The Right to Demand a Hearing in Public or a Hearing In Camera
In the absence of statutory imperatives or circumstances demanding
intervention under the doctrine of procedural fairness, the commission will
have a discretion to determine whether to hold the inquiry in public or in
private. Since the intent in most jurisdictions is to have a public inquiry, a
powerful argument can be made for conducting proceedings in public.
Conversely, since evidentiary privileges at common law are preserved, the
protection of confidential information or trade secrets, by way of example,
may dictate that a hearing be held in camera. The Ontario statute, alone, in
the field of public inquiry legislation provides for the exercise of a statutory
discretion to make this selection. Under section 4, in the case of intimate
personal or financial matters, an in camera hearing may be held. Presumably
this does not exhaust the occasions for directing that matters be dealt with in
private.
I have found that the most interesting area here is with the advent of
television. Most commissioners rather like television. Since they cannot have
it in court, why not have it in the next public inquiry in which they are
involved? The difficulty is that the people who are involved in these public
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inquiries perceive a loss of privacy. One of the difficulties is that if you adopt
the protocol that a person whose conduct is being inquired into should be
entitled to leave his evidence until he or she has heard all the evidence that is
tendered by the commission, then it means that it may be months before a per-
son can have his or her opportunity to respond on television to the evidence
given earlier. And of course television and the print media play up with
headlines what is going on and the poor "victim" has to wait months for the
opportunity to respond. This buttresses the development of the idea of holding
in camera hearings where very sensitive information is given which could
damage a person or be prejudicial to a person, and leaving its release to the
public until closer to the moment that that person will be entitled himself to
give evidence. That arose from time to time in the Stevens' Inquiry and, in
accordance with the extraordinary fairness of commission counsel, such
requests were on every occasion accommodated.
(f) Procedural Matters, Order of Testifying, Right of
Cross-Examination
The right to examine one's own witness and to cross-examine the
witnesses called by commission counsel and others, as opposed to having all
examinations conducted by commission counsel, was clearly established in
Re Shulman. 4
This is again an area in which the exercise of discretion will be required.
Persons whose conduct is being inquired into will wish to tender their evi-
dence after commission counsel has presented all of the inquiry evidence.
Without a right to proceed in this manner, the requisite opportunity to be heard
may be seriously and negatively affected.
The right to cross-examine witnesses should be complete in the sense
that anyone who has a legitimate right to do so should be afforded the oppor-
tunity; on the other hand, the right of cross-examination should be limited to
persons who are, within reasonable limits, adverse to one another in interest.
(g) The Right to Seek Judicial Review of Commission Decisions
Section 6 of the Ontario Public Inquiries Act clearly contemplates judi-
cial review by way of a stated case for the opinion of the Divisional Court by
persons affected. However, there are limits on the right of judicial review as
appears from the decision of Mr. Justice Morden in Re Royal Commn. Into
Metro. Toronto Police Practices and Ashton.' 5 He noted that the earlier
inquiry legislation which was under consideration in the Shulman Inquiry
14 119671 2 O.R. 375, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 578 (C.A.).
15 (1975), 10 O.R. (2d) 113, 27 C.C.C. (2d) 31, 64 D.L.R. (3d) 477 (Div. Ct.).
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prescribed ongoing jurisdiction to state a case with respect to the "validity" of
any decision of the Commission. The statutory language has changed and the
word "authority" has been substituted. In the view of the court in Ashton, this
amendment has the effect of altering the scope of judicial review to confine it
to matters of jurisdiction. Thus the role of the court is supervisory only. It will
not substitute its view for that of the commission.
In Ontario, a case must be stated by the commission at the request of a
party and, failing the commission's willingness to state a case, the court will
direct it to do so. Proceedings on the issue in controversy are stayed pending
resolution of the matter. The same general arrangement exists in Manitoba and
indeed the entire inquiry is stayed pending judicial review.
Under the law in Quebec,' 6 no injunction or writ contemplated by the
provisions of Articles 846-850 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or other legal
proceedings, shall interfere with or stay the proceeding of the commission.
A.G. Quebec and Keable v. A.G. Canada7 illustrates, however, that while
the process continues, the evidence sought will not be compelled during the
process of judicial review.
The federal statute makes no mention of judicial review. Since it is clear
that the tribunal is not functioning in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner, the
judicial review is not open to the parties under section 28 of the Federal Court
Act. 8 Even if it were, it is unlikely that the Court of Appeal would hear an
interlocutory application for judicial review. The appropriate approach is to
pursue the prohibition remedy under section 18(a) of the Act.'
What the grounds are, of course, is the whole issue. Bias and exceeding
the commission's jurisdiction are ones that seem obvious and I would suggest
that it will not be long before procedural fairness will be squarely recognized.
Look at Lord Denning's judgment in the Pergamon Press case,20 which Mr.
Justice Grange cited in the Abel and Penetanguishene case.2' Lord Justice
Denning said, speaking of the situation in that case:
The inspectors can obtain information, likening them to commissions of inquiry,
in any way they think best, but before they condemn or criticise a man, they
must give him a fair opportunity for correcting or contradicting what is said
16 Public Inquiry Commission Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-37, s. 17.
17 Supra, note 6.
18 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
19 This approach was taken in Re Copeland and McDonald, [1978] 2 EC. 815, 42 C.C.C.
(2d) 334, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 724 (T.D.).
20 Re Pergamon Press Ltd., [1970] 3 All E.R. 535, 114 Sol. Jo. 569 (C.A.).
21 Re Abel andPenetanguishene Mental Health Centre (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 279, 46 C.C.C.
(3d) 342, 97 D.L.R. (3d) 304 (C.A.).
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against him. They need not quote chapter and verse. An outline of the charge
will usually suffice."
That was in a different regime from a public inquiry, but if you look at the
statutory requirements for an opportunity to be heard, attend and respond, it's
clear that some minimum procedural fairness will be imposed if it has not
already been imposed by the courts.
(h) Funding
In contemporary society inquiries are sufficiently expensive and it is frequ-
ently argued that the state should fund participation by particular individuals
or groups. Thus funding was granted in the Berger Mackenzie Valley Pipeline
Inquiry, the Marshall Inquiry and the Sick Children's Hospital Inquiry. In-
deed, it has been suggested that in the latter inquiry, standing was denied to
parties in Phase Two in view of the extraordinary cost of funding participants.
In particular circumstances, the right to participate and to be represented by
counsel will be an illusion in the absence of funding. This is particularly so in
the case of persons whose conduct is under review in complex and lengthy
inquiries. Considerations of public policy and the protection of the rights of
individuals insist upon the need for ongoing government recognition of this
requirement.
[In discussion following this paper Mr. Scott elaborated as follows:]
I am not sure that the appropriate approach is to make some provision in the
statutory regimes because it seems to me that no government would do that.
That is really opening the door to a cost that would be absolutely horrendous.
I'm not sure whether there should not be some discretionary mechanism in the
judge to order funding. How to do it, I do not know. But one thing is certain:
as long as we are building on a broad base for public inquiries, unless we
come to grips with this issue and develop some criteria, people are going to be
hurt. There is no question about it. The cost is horrendous. I just cannot ima-
gine any government saying "we'll provide in this statute that the commission
will be the arbiter of whether or not there'll be funding", because obviously
the commission's instinct is to grant funding. There is no contra instinct other
than good management and good sense.
The problem with funding is there's a perception that individuals or insti-
tutions that are not part of the commission that is seeking funding are
fundamentally going to be irresponsible about the consumption of it. And
therefore if you have a good relationship with the commission and there's
expert evidence, for example, that you want, the best way you can get it is by
22 Supra, note 20 at 539.
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having the commission agree to get it and tender it as part of the commission's
assembly of information.
Now it may be, as I have heard in the press there have been hints of this
in Marshall, that there is a disagreement between the commissioner's view of
what may be of value and the views of others who have a very real interest in
the future of the process. In that situation, the only process I know is the
application to the commission in public, under the glare of the media, with a
full developed argument in favour of the need, pointing out the public
interest, in ensuring that the commission's mandate is not criticized after it is
purportedly discharged. If that doesn't work, then all that's left is practical
politics. I cannot see in the near term any government setting up, as a matter
of a statutory regime, a scheme which contemplates public funding for parti-
cipation in these inquiries because I cannot imagine the definition of a formula
for controlling it. I think governments probably like it the way it is, namely,
you go to the commission and you convince the commissioners and if you
cannot convince the commissioners, then that is the commissioners' problem,
not the government's problem. The government can deflect any criticism. In
the Sinclair Stevens Inquiry, if there had been criticism, which there was not,
of Chief Justice Parker's failure to grant funding to the political parties, the
criticism would have been of the commission. Now I suppose it might have
penetrated through to the government which would certainly have been an
attack on the objectivity of the commissioner. But the government surely
would be more content with leaving it on an ad hoc basis to commissioners
than actually setting up a statutory regime.
The traditional method of controlling cost is by length of time. The
commission is told "you've got to report within three months". That obvious-
ly will control expenses. There's also a very sophisticated budgetary
requirement that the government imposes on commissions of inquiry and that
budget is pursued and followed on a regular basis and any extending of it is
subjected to very careful scrutiny. And I can tell you the most uncomfortable
situation is to have the budget of the inquiry made the subject of public de-
bate. There are practical constraints. Whether they are adequate or not, I leave
to the public policy theorists.

